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1. Introduction
In the transposition of the Damages Directive1 across most Member States 
(MS), one issue above all seemed to raise eyebrows and lead to heated dis-
cussions: the binding effect of NCA decisions declaring infringements of 
Articles 101/102 TFEU. This article is meant to discuss what was, what is 
and what might be, in this regard. Case-law provides us already with a sig-
nificant number of direct and indirect clarifications on this issue. The arti-
cle will first look at the binding effect arising from European Commission 
(EC) decisions (section 2) and NCA decisions, before and after the Damages 
Directive (section 3). It will then delve deeper into the material, subjective 
and temporal scopes of these binding effects (section 4, 5 and 6). The obli-
gations of national courts in the case of non-final infringement decisions 
(section 7) and of ongoing investigations (section 8) will also be discussed. 
And since there is more to Competition Law than just infringement deci-
sions, sections 9 to 11 will discuss the binding effects arising from State aid 
decisions, merger control decisions and commitment decisions. Finally, 
section 12 will provide an overview of the debate on the possible limits to 
this binding effect and, ultimately, to the very primacy of EU Law.
2. European Commission infringement decisions
Under Article 16(1) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 (“Reg. 1/2003”),2 European 
Commission (“EC”) decisions identifying infringements of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), 
which have become final (res judicata), are binding upon national courts 
in follow-on private enforcement actions.3 This was largely a codification 
of obligations that already arose from general principles of EU Law (sepa-
ration of powers, direct effect, principles of sincere cooperation and legal 
certainty), as clarified by the Court.4
1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ L 349/1, 05/12/2014). 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1/1, 04/01/2003).
3 Although the Regulation itself does not mention the requirement that the decision be final, the 
case-law does assert this requirement, clearly distinguishing the effects of final and non-final deci-
sions. Some MS (e.g., France, Romania and the UK) technically infringe EU Law by reproducing 
this obligation in their own national legislation.
4 Primarily: Judgment of the Court of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, 
Case C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689, paragraphs 45-52, 56 and 60. See also: Judgment of 28 February 
1991, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, Case C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paragraphs 44-55; 
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Although Regulation 1/2003 only mentions infringement decisions (i.e. 
positive declarations), the ratio of Masterfoods5 applies equally to the deci-
sions with findings of inapplicability (negative declarations) foreseen in 
Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003,6 creating an incentive for undertakings 
accused of antitrust infringement in private litigation to seek such a deci-
sion from the EC.7
A national court can only escape this binding effect of EC decisions 
if it believes that decision to be invalid and the CJEU declares this in a 
referral.8
3. NCA infringement decisions
3.1. Independently from the Damages Directive
Despite the transposition of the Damages Directive, it is still important to 
know the effects, in follow-on private enforcement actions, of NCA deci-
sions identifying infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, due to the 
Directive’s temporal scope, and because the obligation arising from it only 
applies to actions for damages.9
Prior to the Damages Directive, there was no provision of positive 
EU Law governing this issue. However, it is settled that national rules 
Advocate General Van Gerven’s Opinion delivered on 27 October 1993, H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd v. 
British Coal Corporation, Case C-128/92, EU:C:1993:860, paragraph 56; Judgment of 10 April 2008, 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-271/03, EU:T:2008:101, 
paragraph 120; Judgment of 14 October 2010, Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, Case 
C-280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, paragraph 90; Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Gemeenschap 
v. Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 50-54; Judgment of 25 November 
2014, Orange v. European Commission, Case T-402/13, EU:T:2014:991, paragraph 27; Judgment of 
23 November 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA, Case 
C-547/16, EU:C:2017:891, paragraphs 23-24 and 29.
5 Judgment of the Court of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, Case 
C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689.
6 See also recital 14 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
7 In this sense, see: Alexander Schaub, “Panel one discussion: Compatibility, efficiency, legal scru-
tiny”, in European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, eds. 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (England: Hart Publishing, 2001), 35. Nina Bucan 
Gutta, The Enforcement of EU Competition Rules by Civil Law (Maklu Pub, 2014), 138.
8 Judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 314/85 EU:C:1987:452.
9 Expectably, similar questions are already being raised about the binding effect of decisions of 
national authorities entrusted with applying other areas of EU Law – see pending Case C-546/18 
Adler Real Estate.
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concerning burden of proof may need to be adjusted as a result of the prin-
ciple of effectiveness of EU Law.10
The CJEU was asked to clarify the impact of this principle in Cogeco. 
The Court did not need to reply,11 but AG Kokott argued that the exer-
cise of the right to compensation conferred by Article 102 TFEU would be 
made excessively difficult if no effect were recognised to the decisions of 
the MS’s own NCA, given the “special complexity” of many infringements 
of competition law and the practical challenges for claimants to prove such 
infringements. In her view, under the principle of effectiveness, a final 
NCA decision must be treated as indicia of the infringement, creating a 
refutable presumption (prima facie evidence).12 I also believe this to be the 
correct interpretation of EU Law, in line with the solution adopted in the 
Directive and with the position of the EFTA Court,13 and it has a parallel in 
the case-law on the effects of commitment decisions (see below).
So far, there is no case-law precedent explicitly discussing the binding 
effect of decisions of NCAs of other MS. Arguably, the ratio followed by 
the EFTA Court and by AG Kokott would apply equally thereto. Indeed, 
nothing in that ratio is specific to decisions adopted within the same MS or 
dependent upon the decision being adopted by the MS’ own NCA.
I am also unaware of any precedents relating to the legal effects of deci-
sions of NCAs of third countries (e.g., if a claim is litigated in a EU MS 
court, relating to an infringement of US Antitrust Law), but it seems that 
any such effect would be governed exclusively by national law (since such 
decisions could never relate to Articles 101 or 102 TFEU).14 This issue was 
unaffected by the Damages Directive.
10 See, e.g., Judgment of 18 December 2014, CA Consumer Finance SA v. Ingrid Bakkaus and Others, 
Case C-449/13 EU:C:2014:2464, paragraphs 27 et seq.
11 Judgment of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications Inc v. Sport TV Portugal SA and Others, 
Case C-637/17,EU:C:2019:263, paragraphs 56-60. This part of the referral was inadmissible, 
because the res judicata decision in question, as amended by the appeal court, did not identify an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU.
12 AG Kokott’s Opinion delivered on 17 January 2019, Cogeco Communications Inc v. Sport TV 
Portugal SA and Others, C-637/17, EU:C:2019:32, paragraphs 41-42, 92-97 and 103. See also AG 
Mazák’s Opinion delivered on 16 December 2010, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartelamt, C-360/09, 
EU:C:2010:782, paragraph 41.
13 EFTA Court Judgment of 30 May 2018, Fjarskipti hf. v. Síminn hf., E-6/17, paragraphs 43-48. 
This position of the EFTA Court is set out in paragraph 47, despite the broader phrasing of the 
conclusion.
14 Claimants have sometimes produced public enforcement, or even private enforcement, decisions 
from third countries, applying a provision identical to a provision of EU or national Competition 
M&CLR_III_2.indd   54 02/12/2019   16:02:51
55Antitrust Private Enforcement and the Binding Effect of Public Enforcement Decisions | Miguel Sousa Ferro
Prior to the Directive, national rules varied widely between the MS.
Some MS did not deem courts bound, in any way, by infringements 
declared in a public enforcement decision adopted in their own legal order 
(e.g., Portugal,15 Sweden). Undertakings sometimes failed to prove anti-
trust infringements already identified in an NCA decision.16
Some went for intermediate solutions. In Lithuania, decisions of the 
NCA created a refutable presumption of the infringement.17 In France, 
the NCA or review court decision was legally binding only in consumer 
mass damages follow-on actions.18 In Spain, a review court judgment con-
firming an NCA decision was already binding in follow-on actions, but 
a non-appealed NCA decision was seemingly not (a matter for debate).19 
In Italy, the NCA’s final decisions created a refutable presumption of the 
infringement, with some limitations on challenging facts already estab-
lished therein.20
Law, so as to persuade the court to arrive at the same finding. It is, in principle, up to each MS to 
decide how to treat these foreign decisions.
15 See, e.g.: Judgment of the Porto Appeal Court of 1 March 2007, Nestlé Portugal v. Café de Palha 
(529/07-3). Order of the Lisbon Judicial Court of 20 December 2012, NOS v. PT (1774/11.9TVLSB). 
In Latvia, one court was particularly restrictive, prohibiting a claimant from even invoking 
and referring to the NCA decision in a follow-on action, but that ruling was overturned – see: 
Judgment of the Riga Regional Court of 6 December 2010 (case C04293109), followed by judg-
ment of the Latvian Supreme Court of 18 February 2013, described in Julija Jerneva and Inese 
Druviete, “Latvia”, in Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern 
European Countries, ed. Anna Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management 
Press, 2017), 173.
16 See, e.g., for Sweden: Judgment of the Svea Court of Appeal of 29 June 2017, Yarps Network 
Services AB (i likvidation) v. Telia Company AB (T 2673-16), described in Lars Henriksson, 
“Sweden”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in the Member States, org. Barry 
Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro, and Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 358. 
For Portugal, see NOS v. PT, cit.
17 See Judgment of the Appeal Court of 26 May 2006, Siailiu tara v. Stumbras (case 2A-41/2006) 
and Judgment of the Lithuanian Supreme Court of 17 May 2010, Klevo lapas v. Olen Lietuva (case 
3K-3-207/2010), as described in Valentinas Mikelėnas and Rasa Zaščiurinskaitė, “Lithuania”, in 
Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries, ed. Anna 
Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management Press, 2017), 200.
18 Muriel Chagny, “France”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in the Member 
States, org. Barry Rodger, B., Miguel Sousa Ferro, And, M. & Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 101.
19 See Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 3 November 2017, Mediapro v. Real Zaragoza 
(ES:TS:2017:3879).
20 See, e.g.: Court of Cassation, decision no. 13486, 20 June 2011 and Court of Cassation, decision 
no. 7039, 9 May 2012.
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Other Member States (e.g., Germany, Hungary,21 Slovakia,22 Slovenia,23 
and the United Kingdom24) treated decisions of their own NCA as creat-
ing irrefutable presumptions (at least, in principle). Germany also granted 
binding effects to decisions of NCAs of other Member States.
It has been argued that, even absent binding legal effects, national courts 
were generally inclined to identify infringements which had already been 
identified in a decision of the respective NCA, and that such decisions, de 
facto, had very strong persuasive force.25
3.2. Following the Damages Directive
Article 9(1) and (2) (together with Article 2(7) and (10) and recitals 34-36) 
of the Damages Directive require MS to ensure that res judicata public 
enforcement decisions, which identify an infringement of Articles 101/102 
TFEU:26 (a) create an irrefutable presumption of the existence of the 
infringement in question, when adopted by the respective MS’s NCA; (b) 
is prima facie evidence of the infringement in question, when adopted by 
another MS’s NCA27.
Given the scope of the Directive, and some national case-law,28 and not-
withstanding the effects of general principles discussed above, it seems 
these rules are relevant only in actions for damages, not in other follow-on 
21 See: Article 88/B(6) of the Hungarian Competition Act, introduced in July 2014 to alter the oppo-
site situation created by a prior court ruling. As explained in Peter Miskolczi Bodnár, “Hungary”, 
in Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries, ed. 
Anna Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management Press, 2017), 130 and 148.
22 Ondrej Blažo, “Slovakia”, in Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern 
European Countries, ed. Anna Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management 
Press, 2017), 258.
23 Judgment of the Ljubljana High Court of 21 November 2013, Blitz v. Kolosej, quoted in Ana 
Vlahek and Podobnik Klemen , “Slovenia”, in Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in 
Central and Eastern European Countries, ed. Anna Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty 
of Management Press, 2017), 288.
24 Section 58A of the Competition Act 1998.
25 See, e.g.: Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 3 November 2017, Mediapro v. Real Zaragoza 
(ES:TS:2017:3879) (“aunque pudiera constituir un instrumento de convicción de gran autoridad”); 
Chagny, M., “France”, 101.
26 All MS transpositions have extended this legal effect to decisions of their own NCA which exclu-
sively apply national competition law.
27 Criticising this asymmetry: Andersson, Torbjörn. “The binding effects of decisions and judg-
ments under EU competition law”. In EU Competition Litigation: Transposition and First 
Experiences of the New Regime, edited by Magnus Strand, Vladimir Bastidas, Marios C. Iacovides. 
England: Hart, 2019.
28 See: Bucan Gutta, The Enforcement of EU Competition Rules, 138.
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actions (e.g., seeking injunction or declaration of nullity). The same is not 
necessarily true for national transpositions, depending on their scope (e.g., 
in Portugal, it applies to any follow-on action).
The binding effect applies to the res judicata NCA decision on the 
infringement:29
(i) If it is not appealed within the deadline and becomes final;
(ii) If it is appealed, but not in what concerns the finding of the infringe-
ment itself (e.g., only in what concerns the amount of the fine);30 or
(iii) If it is appealed, but not by the undertaking against whom the private 
enforcement action has been filed (subjective scope of res judicata).
If the NCA decision is appealed (in the relevant part, by the relevant per-
son), the binding decision will be the review court judgment, which may 
identify the same or a different infringement from the one identified in the 
NCA decision. This judgment becomes binding:
(i) If it is not appealed within the deadline;
(ii) If it is handed down by a last instance review court; or
(iii) If the judgment is appealed, but not in what concerns the finding of 
infringement.
Unfortunately, the Directive only includes “ordinary means of appeal” in 
the concept of review court.31 Subject to CJEU interpretation of that concept, 
this seems to mean a decision may be deemed final, under the Directive, while 
there is still a chance that it will be overturned (e.g., by a Constitutional Court,32 
by the ECHR, or in an extraordinary case-law uniformization appeal).33 
Should national courts stay proceedings in such cases? Are they bound by EU 
29 The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for EC decisions.
30 This interpretation has been explicitly included in the transposition of the Damages Directive 
in France.
31 See Article 9(1). Article 2(10) of the Damages Directive.
32 Judicial review systems vary from MS to MS. In Portugal, for example, if an NCA decision is 
deemed to have infringed the Constitution by the Constitutional Court, the act is annulled with-
out a further decision by an administrative or judicial authority being required.
33 See, for England & Wales: Enron Coal Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v. English, Welsh and 
Scottish Railway Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 2. Similar issues arise about extraordinary cases in which 
a res judicata judgment may be amended or revoked – for Portugal, see Article 80 of the General 
Misdemeanour Regime, and Articles 449 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
M&CLR_III_2.indd   57 02/12/2019   16:02:52
58  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 2 / october 2019 / 51-80
Law to decide in accordance with a decision which may still be annulled? Are 
they still bound even if it is annulled in an extraordinary means of appeal? 
The Directive suggests so, but that would be a strange state of affairs.
As for the binding effect of decisions of NCAs of other MS, the expression 
prima facie evidence is typically understood as meaning evidence which 
is not conclusive (i.e., not an irrefutable presumption), but which stands 
until contradictory evidence is presented to the court, effectively implying 
a (at least initial) reversal of the burden of proof. Thus, both prior to, and 
after, the Damages Directive and its transposition, decisions of NCAs of 
other Member States create a juris tantum (refutable) presumption. Some 
MS have slightly changed the language in their transposition to make this 
clearer.34 No MS, other than Germany, went further and gave decisions of 
other MS the effect of irrefutable presumptions.
The differentiation of the legal value of administrative and judicial deci-
sions of other MS (not initially proposed by the Commission) seems to be 
rooted in a distrust by some MS and some MEPs in the compliance with the 
rule of law and judiciary independence in other MS.35 These concerns are 
unlikely to disappear despite the ECN+ Directive36. While the basis for these 
concerns is well known and not unreasonable, it is difficult to reconcile them 
with a legal order which decentralises the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU and trusts MS to apply those rules in accordance with EU Law 
and fundamental rights, and which has harmonised Private International 
Law rules in a way that often allows injured parties to sue in a MS different 
from the one where the public enforcement decision was adopted.37
To date, there are very few known instances where a public enforcement 
decision of one MS has been invoked before courts of another MS in a 
follow-on action.38
34 See, e.g., for Portugal, Article 7(2) of Law 23/2018 (“presunção ilidível”).
35 See Maria José Costeira, “A transposição da Diretiva Private Enforcement: Perspetiva crítica”, UNIO 
– EU Law Journal 3, no. 2 (2017): 175. The European Parliament also strangely questioned whether 
the EU was competent do adopt such a rule – see European Parliament, Resolution of 26 March 2009 
on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52009IP0187, paragraphs 2 and 6.
36 Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 11 December 2018 (OJ L 
11/3, 14/01/2019).
37 On enforcement of judicial decisions of other MS in this context, see AG Jääskinen’s Opinion 
delivered on 11 December 2014, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide v. Evonik Degussa GmbH and Others, 
C-352/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443, paragraph 116 and footnote 132.
38 See the flyLAL case (between Lithuania and Latvia), still ongoing, which led to Case C-302/13 
flyLAL (I) EU:C:2014:2319, and to Case C-27/17 flyLAL (II) EU:C:2018:533; and a case involving 
M&CLR_III_2.indd   58 02/12/2019   16:02:52
59Antitrust Private Enforcement and the Binding Effect of Public Enforcement Decisions | Miguel Sousa Ferro
EU Law does not award binding legal effects to private enforcement judg-
ments in subsequent cases relating to the same infringement. However, the 
Romanian transposition may allow for an interpretation that such judg-
ments also create an irrefutable presumption.39
Issues such as the scope of the burden of allegation of facts by the party 
invoking the binding effect of the public enforcement decision, or the 
moment until when a Commission or NCA decision may be added to the 
case file,40 are governed by national law, subject to equivalence and effec-
tiveness, and may lead to heterogeneous solutions throughout the EU.
As Article 9(3) (and recital 35) of the Damages Directive reminds us, 
national courts are empowered (and may be obliged) to use the referral 
mechanism to ask the CJEU for clarifications about the precise extent to 
which they are bound by a public enforcement decision or any other spe-
cific doubt which may arise.
4. Material scope of the binding effect
Res judicata (EC or own NCA) decisions establish the existence of the 
infringement. The party invoking the infringement benefits from an irref-
utable presumption (juris et de jure) of the existence of that infringement, 
as declared in the decision/judgment, simply by producing it or having it 
produced. This effect is limited to the finding that a “prohibited agreement 
or practice exists”, while “the existence of loss and of a direct causal link 
(…) remains, by contrast, a matter to be assessed by the national court”.41 
This must also apply to national decisions.42
Greece and the Netherlands – Macedonian Thrace Brewery v. Heineken et al., filed on 23 February 
2017 before the District Court Amsterdam, C/ 13/ 626096, HA ZA 17- 321.
39 Article 9(1) of Emergency Ordinance 39/2017. See: Valentin Mircea, “Romania”, in 
Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries, ed. Anna 
Piszcz (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management Press, 2017), 244.
40 In this regard, for Portugal, see: Judgment of the Porto Appeal Court of 1 March 2007, Nestlé 
Portugal v. Café de Palha (529/07-3).
41 Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, 
EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 65-66. See also AG Cruz Villalón’s Opinion delivered on 26 June 2012, 
Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, C-199/11, EU:C:2012:388, paragraph 54.
42 In this sense, see, e.g.: Enron Coal Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v. English, Welsh and Scottish 
Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 7. Barry Rodger, “United Kingdom”, in The EU Antitrust Damages 
Directive: Transposition in the Member States, org. Barry Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro, and 
Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 378. Paola Piroddi, “Damages actions 
for infringement of competition rules and the right to a fair trial under article 6(1) ECHR”, in 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro et al. (Valladolid: Lex 
Nova, 2011), 445.
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In other words, the claimant must still prove that there were damages 
(unless it is a cartel and the presumption of damages applies), that the 
damages were caused by that infringement, and quantify the damages to 
the extent feasible. In the past, claimants have often failed to obtain dam-
ages even in cases in which the infringement was already proven.43
The scope of the binding effect extends, according to the Directive’s 
recital 34, reproduced in several MS transpositions,44 to the material, per-
sonal, temporal and territorial scope of the infringement identified in the 
decision. But this is of little help. As noted in the UK, national courts have 
had “difficulties in determining the scope of the effect of a prior binding 
infringement decision”.45 Courts have disagreed about which infringement 
was identified.46
To understand the practical difficulties, one must first realise that, in 
reality, EC/NCA and review court decisions often do not provide a clear 
description of what the infringement was. From the perspective of a 
potential injured party trying to understand whether the infringement 
in question affected it, the operative part will almost always be insuffi-
cient to understand what, exactly, was the infringement. It is one thing 
to know that there were, e.g., price fixing agreements in a given market 
over a given period of time. But this may not be enough to know what 
exactly was agreed, which products and sales were specifically affected and 
how, if the duration of the infringement is different from the timeframe of 
the sales it affected,47 etc. This may not even be perceptible from the full 
text of the (public or even confidential) decision. This problem has been 
43 As noted in Richard Whish, “Damages actions in the Courts of England and Wales”, in Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law, Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro et al. (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 
2011), 158. See, e.g., for Poland: Judgment of the Krakow Court of Appeal of 10 January 2014 (I Aca 
1322/13), and Judgment of the Lublin Regional Court of 4 July 2014 (I C 759/08), both described in 
Maciej Bernatt & Maciej Gac., “Poland”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in 
the Member States, org. Barry Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro, and Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 290.
44 See, e.g., for Portugal, Article 7(1), (2) and (3) of Law 23/2018.
45 Rodger, “United Kingdom”, 378. See, as precedents from England & Wales: Enron Coal Services 
Ltd (in Liquidation) v. English, Welsh and Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 7 and on appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, [2009] EWCA Civ 647, and also the subsequent Court of Appeal ruling in the 
same case [2011] EWCA Civ 2. Emerson Electric Co v. Morgan Crucible Co PLc [2011] CAT 4. Deans 
Foods Ltd v. Roche Products Ltd, Case no. 1029/5/7/04.
46 Enron Coal Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v. English, Welsh and Scottish Railway Ltd [2009] CAT 
7, [2009] EWCA Civ 647 and [2011] EWCA Civ 2.
47 While the issue may not arise for exchanges falling within the middle of the period identified in 
the public enforcement decision, there may be substantial discussions about whether the declared 
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exacerbated by authorities’ willingness to negotiate the content of a deci-
sion in exchange for a settlement with the undertakings under investiga-
tion, sometimes making decisions so vague as to be useless for follow-on 
claims for damages,48 at least by themselves (without some clarification or 
access to the case file). That being said, the declared infringement must be 
understood to be the one identified in the operative part of the decision, 
even if it is necessary to resort to the body of the decision, and to other 
documents, to properly interpret the operative part. This is also clear in 
the case of review court judgments, whose operative part may say nothing 
more than “the appeal is dismissed” or “partly dismissed”.49
Public enforcers sometimes use the rendering of private enforcement 
actions as a bargaining chip to achieve settlements and save time and 
resources. While this may be legitimate, the EC/NCAs should, perhaps, 
also keep in mind that they have a duty to cooperate with national courts 
and are subject to the principle of effectiveness. Both these principles may 
arguably be interpreted as requiring them not to deprive Article 16(1) of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Article 9(1) of the Damages Directive of their 
effet utile by making their decisions so succinct that it is impossible or 
excessively difficult to identify the infringement.
In a worst case scenario of incompleteness or obscurity of the decision, it 
must be possible for a national court to ask the EC for clarifications which 
will allow it to understand which infringement was declared, and whether 
the specific exchanges in question in the private enforcement action before 
it fall within that infringement. The same is probably true of the duty of 
cooperation of competition authorities with national courts in each MS 
legal order.
infringement encompasses exchanges immediately after the initial date (or only sometime after), 
and whether it encompasses exchanges occurred sometime after the final date.
48 See, e.g.: David Ashton, Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice, 2nd edi-
tion (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2018), 87; Damien Geradinand, Evi Mattioli, “The trans-
actionalization of EU competition law: A positive development?” (September 20, 2017), TILEC 
Discussion Papers 2017, no. DP 2017-035, https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-
and-research-groups/tilec/research/discussion-papers/2017.
49 Certain legal orders may provide additional difficulties in this regard – see, e.g.: Mary Catherine 
Lucey, “Ireland”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in the Member States, 
org. Barry Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro, and Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018), 193, Barry Doherty and Anne Fitzpatrick, “Courage to change? The rocky road to Directive 
2014/104/ EU and the future of private competition law enforcement in Ireland”, Irish Journal of 
European Law 18, no. 2 (2015): 15.
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While it will almost always be necessary to resort to the body of the 
decision/judgment, only the statements included therein which positively 
define the scope of the declared infringement are binding on national 
courts (limited to the finding that a “prohibited agreement or practice 
exists”50).
Thus, instrumental “facts” affirmed in the decision are not, in them-
selves, binding, unless they are an integral and indispensable part of the 
declaration of infringement. If, for example, in a decision identifying a 
price-fixing cartel (object restriction), the Commission mentions that the 
cartel led to a price increase, this is, in principle, not an integral part of 
the finding of infringement and is not binding. Some NCAs may need to 
discuss the effects of a given practice (even an object restriction) so as to 
assess its gravity and justify the amount of the fine, but any position taken 
in this context is not relevant for the finding of the infringement in itself.
Differently, a declaration of an effects infringement necessarily includes 
a description of the effects on the market, which are indissociable from the 
declaration of the infringement and are, thus, binding. An identification 
of an abuse of dominance is indissociable from a given market definition, 
which must also be binding in a follow-on action. A national court judg-
ment cannot, without incurring in internal contradiction, be bound by 
those findings of fact in what concerns the existence of the infringement, 
but disregard them for other purposes (e.g., when assessing causality or 
damages).
Some authors have suggested that this debate may also arise around the 
finding of fault. But such positions may rest on the misconception that the 
requirement of fault in damages actions based on infringements of Articles 
101/102 TFEU is governed by national law, whereas, as I understand the 
case-law, it is governed by EU Law. Following the Skanska ruling,51 and 
its harmonisation of the solutions for public and private enforcement, it 
seems expectable that the CJEU will clarify that EU Competition Law does 
not require the demonstration of fault as a basis for liability for damages 
in these actions. This is an issue of the interpretation of Articles 101/102 
TFEU and general principles of EU Law. It is thus inconsequential to argue 
that the Directive did not harmonise this aspect (or to point out its recital 
50 Judgment of 6 November 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, 
EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 65.
51 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Cantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and Others, 
C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204.
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11). Precedents in other areas of EU Law clearly establish that if a right 
already derives from the Treaty (the requirement of fault is a fundamental 
component in the identification of a right to damages arising from Articles 
101/102 TFEU), a harmonising Directive cannot in itself limit that right.52
As for actions based exclusively on infringements of national competi-
tion law, if the NCA decision is required by national law to establish some 
degree of fault, this finding must also be deemed binding in a follow-on 
action.53
Whereas a finding of an infringement of Article 102 incorporates the 
assessment of procompetitive effects (economic balance test), a declaration 
of an infringement of Article 101(1) need not, necessarily, imply a decla-
ration that the requisites of Article 101(3) are not met. Often, competi-
tion authorities simply affirm that infringers have not met their burden 
of proof that the requisites are met. If so, the legally binding effect is lim-
ited to the declaration of the infringement of Article 101(1). If so, it is still, 
in principle, open to the undertakings in question to try to prove, in the 
follow-on action, that the requisites of 101(3) were met, as long as this is 
done by putting forward novel evidence and/or arguments which were not 
already considered in the res judicata public enforcement decision.
A negative declaration, saying there is no infringement because one or 
more of the requisites of the prohibition is not met is not binding under 
Article 9(1) of the Directive. At least two Member States – Hungary and 
Poland – amended their national laws specifically to ensure this outcome. 
But actually, when it comes to infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, 
national public enforcement proceedings may not lead to negative declara-
tions.54 So this issue can only be raised about negative declarations relating 
to national competition law.
52 See, e.g., in the realm of free movement of workers, the case-law on the concept of worker – 
Judgment of 19 June 2014, Jessy Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, C-507/12, 
EU:C:2014:2007 (e.g., paragraph 32).
53 In this sense, see: Henriksson, “Sweden”, 358; and Jerneva and Druviete, “Latvia”, 174. In 
Germany, there is a precedent which adopts this interpretation – see: Landgericht Köln, 88 O 1/11, 
17 January 2013 (CR 2013, 297-302), paragraphs 184 et seq.; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 6 U 
52/12 Kart, 31 July 2013 (IBRRS 2013, 5084 = NZKart 2014, 366), paragraphs 46-47, as described in 
Ashton, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, §2.70.
54 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v. Tele2 Polska 
sp. z o.o., devenue Netia SA, C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270, maxime paragraphs 21-30; Judgment of 25 
November 2014, Orange v. European Commission, T-402/13, EU:T:2014:991, paragraph 30.
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5. Subjective scope of the binding effect
The binding effect of EU decisions (EC decisions and GCEU/CJEU judg-
ments) is governed by the Masterfoods55 case-law and by Article 16(1) of 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Neither mention subjective scope. Understandably 
so. As noted above, this binding effect is not rooted in effectiveness or 
reasons of procedural economy, it is rooted in the separation of powers 
between EU/MS, in the exclusive powers of the EC, the primacy of EU Law, 
and the need to ensure the uniform application of EU Competition Law.
Accordingly, the declaration of the infringement by the Commission (or 
confirmed by the Court) must be binding on national courts (irrefutable 
presumption) regardless of the parties to the dispute, and of whether or 
not they were addressees of the EU decision (erga omnes effect). Even in 
disputes between third parties, national courts cannot conclude that an 
infringement already declared in the exercise of exclusive EU powers did 
not occur. This interpretation is harmonious with the Court’s case-law on 
commitment decisions and their impact on the rights of third parties (see 
below).
However, this has not been the interpretation adopted by some national 
courts.56
As for national decisions (NCAs and review courts), we must distinguish 
the legal obligations which derive from Articles 101/102 TFEU, together 
with general principles of EU Law, from the legal obligations which derive 
from the Damages Directive and its transpositions.
Prior to the Directive, an NCA decision had to be treated as prima facie 
evidence in order to ensure the effectiveness of the right to damages deriv-
ing from the Treaty. This reasoning does not depend on the identity of 
the addressees of the decision, nor of whether they took part in the pub-
lic enforcement decision and had the opportunity to defend themselves in 
that context. The justification for granting the decision some legal effects 
is based on whether it is impossible or excessively difficult to prove the 
infringement in the absence of this prima facie evidence. Accordingly, it 
is this test which must be applied, while also applying the same test to 
55 Judgment of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689.
56 A UK court seemingly interpreted the Law as meaning that only the legal persons who were the 
addressees of an EC decision were bound by that decision in a follow-on action – see: Emerson 
Electric Co v. Morgan Crucible Co plc [2011] CAT 4, as described in Rodger, “United Kingdom”, 
378. In Portugal, a national court agreed with the EC that a UEFA Regulation was invalid, but did 
not seem to consider itself bound by the previous declaration of that invalidity by the EC – see 
judgment of the Lisbon Appeal Court of 10 November 2009, VSC and FPF v. RTP (4292/1999.L1).
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the third party (which, unlike the infringing undertaking, may not have 
access to evidence necessary to prove the absence of the infringement). 
Indeed, such an effect would not be admissible if it made it impossible or 
excessively difficult for the third party to disprove the infringement. This 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Under the Directive57 and its transpositions, the infringement is irrefu-
tably established for the purposes of actions for damages. Again, the ratio 
legis is the protection of the effectiveness of the right to damages and the 
promotion of legal certainty and uniform application of EU Law. While 
some may argue that the reference to the “personal” scope, in recital 34, 
should be understood as referring to the legal entity identified in the NCA 
decision, Competition Law is not formalistic in that way. When identi-
fying the “person” referred to, one must consider that Competition Law 
prohibits infringements by “undertakings”, defined as economic units. 
An NCA is free to decide which legal entity within the “undertaking” it 
imposes the fine on, but, in the eyes of Competition Law, the infringement 
was carried out by the “undertaking”.58
This means that, arguably, the binding effect of a decision addressed to 
a subsidiary may also be invoked against its parent company in a follow-
on action. While the Court has not specifically clarified this issue, it has 
provided the basis for the answer in Skanska,59 when it stated that all clari-
fications of liability in public enforcement apply to private enforcement, 
and that EU Competition Law is a lex specialis which assigns liability for 
infringements to the “undertaking”, defined as an economic unit.
The argument that this infringes fundamental rights, as the parent com-
pany was not given the opportunity to defend itself, is formalistic and 
erroneous. The very concept of “undertaking” rests on the determination 
that the parent company is able to exercise control over the subsidiary, and 
so it had the ability to direct it in its defence against the public enforcement 
decision. Furthermore, the argument may be turned on its head. Even if 
a parent company is not an addressee of an EC or NCA decision, since 
the decision can have legal effects on it in follow-on actions, the requisites 
57 Article 9(1) and (2) and recital 34.
58 There is always the right of challenging the inclusion of a given legal person within the “under-
taking”.
59 Judgment of 14 March 2019, Vantaan kaupunki v. Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and Others, 
C-724/17, EU:C:2019:204. See Christian Kersting, “Private law liability of the undertaking pursu-
ant to Art. 101 TFEU”, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (2019), 290, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439973.
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of Article 263(§4) TFEU, as clarified in the Plaumann case-law60 (and the 
equivalent requisites of, likely, all MS legal orders), are met. It is directly 
and individually affected and has the right to appeal the decision.
On the flipside of the coin, for the purposes of follow-on actions, the 
effects of an appeal against an EC/NCA decision, by any legal entity within 
an undertaking, must extend to all legal entities within the undertaking, 
and even to its managers and directors.61
As it has been accepted that this binding effect is needed to ensure the 
effectiveness of the right to damages, concluding that only the legal per-
sons who were addressees of the decision are bound by the irrefutable pre-
sumption of the infringement (and not the whole undertaking of which 
they are a part) could often jeopardise that effectiveness, allowing under-
takings to escape liability simply through corporate restructuring (as dem-
onstrated in Skanska), or through depletion of assets. It would also create a 
heterogeneous solution in relation to the binding effects of infringements 
declared by the EC.
I believe the same reasoning requires the binding effect to extend to hori-
zontal or vertical descending liability (liability of subsidiaries for infringe-
ments carried out by the parent company or other subsidiaries),62 but this 
is an issue which has not been clearly settled in the case-law, even in the 
sphere of public enforcement. There are recent precedents in Spain, namely 
from the commercial court of Valencia, in the trucks cartel, which have 
declared the binding effect for the subsidiary of the finding of infringe-
ment in the decision addressed to the parent company. 
60 Judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Economic Community, 
25/62, EU:C:1963:17. In this regard, see, by analogy, the right of appeal relating to commitment deci-
sions recognised to third parties in Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa Company Ltd v. Commission of 
the European Communities, T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220, and Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe 
Canal + European Commission, T-873/16, EU:T:2018:904.
61 Managers and directors of undertakings are not subject to fines by the European Commission, 
but they are subject to fines imposed by the NCAs of some of the Member States (e.g., Portugal 
and Spain). In these countries, theoretically, managers and directors may also be defendants in 
follow-on claims for damages and may also be subject to the irrefutable presumption created by 
the declaration of the infringement in the NCA decision (but only if they were addressees of the 
decision, since they are not a constituent part of the “undertaking”). For further on this issue, see 
Kersting, “Private law liability”, and, specifically for Portugal: Maria Elisabete Ramos, “Situação 
do ‘private enforcement’ da concorrência em Portugal”, Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, no. 
27-28 (2016): 27; Jorge Manuel Coutinho de Abreu, Responsabilidade Civil dos Administradores de 
Sociedades, 2.ª edição (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010), 83 et ss.
62 See Christian Kersting, “Liability of sister companies and subsidiaries in European competition 
law”, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 182, no. 8 (2018).
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Also thanks to Skanska, we already know that the binding effect of an 
EC/NCA decision extends to the legal or purely economic successor of the 
infringing undertaking, making this a hot topic in mergers and acquisi-
tions. Again, a different conclusion would make it easy for companies to 
deprive the right to damages of its effet utile.
The subjective scope is also temporal, since decisions often distinguish 
the period during which the various undertakings participated in the 
infringement in question.
In the case of decisions declaring a single and continuous infringement, 
we can extract from the general principle affirmed in Skanska that cartel 
members are liable for the various components of that infringement, even 
if they did not participate in all of them, because they contributed to the 
common objectives of the infringement and were aware of, or could rea-
sonably have foreseen, the existence of the overall infringement (poten-
tially, relating to sales of products the undertaking does not supply, in ter-
ritories where it had no sales, etc.).63
Often, in cartel cases, some undertakings appeal the EC/NCA decision 
and others do not (namely due to leniency or settlements). Considering the 
joint and several liability of cartel participants, injured parties are faced 
with the option of suing only those against whom the decision is already 
final, or of suing all of them jointly and litigating a case in which it must 
prove the infringement for some, but not for others (or a staying of pro-
ceedings would be justified for some, but not for others). This is bound to 
raise complex questions.64
If, for example, an undertaking which settled is sued by a customer of 
one of the other cartel members, it is bound by the declaration of infringe-
ment. However, the other cartel member is not, and the decision could 
even be annulled by a review court as far as it is concerned. If so, the car-
tel member who paid the damages under joint and several liability would 
only be able to recover that compensation from the undertaking which 
succeeded in having the decision annulled if it proved that it did indeed 
take part in an unlawful cartel. In the same example, would the sued cartel 
63 See, e.g.: Michael J. Frese, “Civil liability for single and continuous infringements”, World 
Competition 41, no. 2 (2018): 179.
64 See, e.g.: Anna Piszcz, “Implementing the rules of the Damages Directive on joint and several 
liability: The SME derogation”, EU Competition Litigation: Transposition and First Experiences 
of the New Regime, ed. Magnus Strand, Vladimir Bastidas, Marios C. Iacovides (England: Hart, 
2019).
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member be allowed to call the other cartel members to the action, even 
though this would effectively mean forcing the injured party to litigate 
against all of them? As the Directive is seemingly silent on these issues, 
the answer to these questions must be found in national procedural law, 
subject to the limits of equivalence and effectiveness.
6. Temporal scope of the binding effect
Beyond the temporal scope of the finding of infringement in itself, issues 
may arise with the temporal scope of the binding effect, because of suc-
cession of laws. The question does not arise in relation to the irrefutable 
presumption created by EC decisions, or the value of prima facie evidence 
of NCA decisions, since both derive from the Treaty and general principles 
of EU Law, as clarified by Court.
The question arises, however, whether NCA decisions adopted prior 
to the transposition of the Directive in the respective MS are binding on 
a national court faced with a follow-on action, if it is deciding after the 
transposition is in force. The answer depends on whether Article 9(1) is 
deemed a procedural or substantive provision. In the first case, it should 
be applied to pending cases. In Cogeco, AG Kokott stated it was a substan-
tive provision,65 but provided no justification. This position seems to imply 
that all rules relating to the probative value of documents are substantive, 
which, as a matter of EU Law, seems rather doubtful. It is not up to the MS 
to decide this issue based exclusively on their own national law, because 
they are required to comply with their obligation under Articles 9(1) and 
22 of the Directive and to interpret national provisions in conformity with 
the Directive, to the extent possible.
7.  Obligations of national courts relating to non-final infringement 
decisions
A national court faced with a follow-on action to an EC infringement deci-
sion which is not yet final is not entirely free to decide what to do.66 The 
obligation to avoid contradiction with EC decisions exists even if the deci-
sion is not yet final (e.g., appealed to the GCEU), and even if its applica-
tion has been suspended. This is so because acts of EU Institutions “are in 
65 AG Kokott’s Opinion delivered on 17 January 2019, Cogeco Communications Inc v. Sport TV 
Portugal SA and Others, C-637/17, EU:C:2019:32, paragraph 62.
66 It is not entirely compatible with EU Law for the transposition of the Damages Directive to say 
that courts “may” (an option) stay proceedings – see, e.g., for Portugal, Article 7(4) of Law 23/2018.
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principle presumed to be lawful until such time as they are annulled or 
withdrawn”, and because the national court cannot control the validity 
of those acts. In these cases, the court has only two options: (i) suspend 
proceedings to await the outcome of the annulment action; or (ii) suspend 
proceedings and refer the issue of the validity of the decision to the CJEU.67 
The national court should assess “whether it is necessary to order interim 
measures in order to safeguard the interests of the parties pending final 
judgment”68 (the effectiveness of rights conferred by the EU legal order 
requiring such interim measures to be issued when this is the case).
The same approach may be used for non-final NCA decisions, since 
national courts must interpret their national transposition in conformity 
with the Directive, ensuring that the effet utile of Article 9(1)’s obligation 
is protected.
8. Obligations of national courts relating to ongoing investigations
Under Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, if the Commission is investi-
gating an infringement, national courts must “avoid giving decisions 
which would conflict with” the potential decision, and, for that purpose, 
“may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings”. There is no 
obligation to stay proceeding to wait for the decision, but the duty of sin-
cere cooperation suggests this may be the ideal option (to be exercised ex 
officio).69 National courts can request information from the Commission 
about ongoing investigations.70
As a matter of EU Law, there is no corresponding obligation for ongoing 
investigations before NCAs. However, such an obligation may derive from 
national law.71
67 Judgment of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689, 
paragraphs 53-57 and 59. See also AG Cosmas’ Opinion delivered on 16 May 2000, Masterfoods Ltd 
v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:249, paragraphs 38-48 and 50-55.
68 Judgment of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689, 
paragraph 58. See also: Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, 
T-873/16, EU:T:2018:904, paragraphs 104 and 116.
69 This has been specifically foreseen, e.g., in Portugal (see Article 7(4) of Law 23/2018 and Public 
Consultation Report, paragraph 36).
70 See European Commission, Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and 
the courts of the EU MS in application of Arts 81 and 82 EC (OJ C 101/54, 27/04/2004, as revised in 
OJ C 256/5, 05/08/2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A5200
4XC0427%2803%29, paragraphs 21 and 22.
71 In Portugal, this scenario has been foreseen in the transposition of the Damages Directives, 
which allows courts discretion in deciding whether to suspend proceedings (Article 7(4) of Law 
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9. State aid decisions
The Court has already provided clarifications on the effects of State aid 
decisions in the context of private enforcement actions. When a national 
court is asked by a competitor for damages and/or to order the recovery 
of unlawfully granted, non-notified State aid (and to prevent ongoing aid), 
there are two possible scenarios:72
a) if the EC has not initiated a formal examination procedure, the 
national court must, by itself, decide if the measure constitutes State 
aid and should have been notified;
b) if the Commission has initiated the formal examination procedure 
under Article 108(2) TFEU, its preliminary finding that the meas-
ure constitutes State aid does have legal effects: the national court 
is required to adopt all necessary measures to draw the appropri-
ate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend 
implementation. The national court may decide to suspend imple-
mentation of the measure and order recovery of payments already 
made. It should order provisional measures needed to safeguard 
the interests of the parties concerned and the effectiveness of the 
Commission’s decision.73
23/2018). The fact that a public enforcement investigation is pending before the NCA concerning 
the same infringement does not create a situation of lis pendens, nor any other impediment to the 
exercise of the court’s powers, including the adoption of provisional measures (Judgment of the 
Lisbon Court of Appeal of 20 May 2010, [B] v. [Banco…] e [S] (1/10.0TVLSB.L1-8). With a seem-
ingly similar solution, see: Judgment of the Prague Higher Court of 16 August 2012 (case 222/2012); 
and Judgment of the Prague Higher Court of 4 June 2013 (case 126/2013), quoted in Michal Petr, 
“Czech Republic”, in Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European 
Countries, ed. Anna Piszcz, (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Faculty of Management Press, 2017), 
105. In Hungary, civil courts were (and continue to be) required to suspend the procedure and wait 
for the decision of the Hungarian NCA – see Bodnár, “Hungary”, 130.
72 It goes without saying that a national court, faced with a private enforcement action relating to 
(alleged) State aid measures, is absolutely bound by a decision of the EC declaring that the measure 
in question does not constitute State aid, or that it is compatible with the TFEU.
73 Judgment of 21 November 2013, Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH, 
C-284/12, EU:C:2013:755, paragraphs 31-45. Order of 4 April 2014, Flughafen Lübeck GmbH v. 
Air Berlin plc & Co. Luftverkehrs KG, C-27/13 EU:C:2014:240, paragraphs 18-27. See: Viktor 
Kreuschitz and Nuria Bermejo, “The role of national courts in the enforcement of the European 
state aid rules”, in EU Competition and State Aid Rules: Public and Private Enforcement, eds. Vesna 
Tomljenovic, et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2017), 221.
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The national court may not decline to decide or order measures before 
the EC adopts its decision on the State aid measure in question, because 
this would have the same effect as rejecting the application and would 
deprive Article 108(3) of its effectiveness.74
10. Merger control decisions
There has, seemingly, not yet been a discussion, at EU or national level, 
of the binding effect of EC merger control decisions in follow-on actions 
before national courts (based, e.g., on damages caused by gun-jumping). 
No binding effect is imposed by the Directive for follow-on actions relat-
ing to EC/NCA merger control decisions. Nor has, seemingly, any Member 
State taken this extra step. That being said, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the Court’s case-law on the effects of the Commission’s decisions 
applying Articles 101/102 and State aid rules should be applied by analogy 
to merger control.
11. Commitment decisions
Commitment decisions are adopted by the EC under Article 9 of Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003,75 and by NCAs under their respective national laws. Such 
decisions do not certify compliance (they do not “legalise” past behav-
iour), so national courts are free to conclude that the practice in question 
infringed EU Law.76
An EC commitment decision is preceded by a preliminary assessment 
where “competition concerns” (potential infringements) are identified, 
but it does not decisively find that there was, or still is, an infringement 
of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.77 The same is true for commitment decisions 
74 Order of 4 April 2014, Flughafen Lübeck GmbH v. Air Berlin plc & Co. Luftverkehrs KG, C-27/13 
EU:C:2014:240, paragraphs 28-32.
75 See also recitals 13 and 22 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. See also: Judgment of 12 December 
2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, T-873/16, EU:T:2018:904, paragraphs 63, 89 and 
99; Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220, paragraphs 89-91; Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v. 
Alrosa Company Ltd, C-441/07, EU:C:2010:377, paragraphs 34-35.
76 Judgment of 23 November 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos 
Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, EU:C:2017:891, paragraphs 25-28. AG Kokott’s Opinion delivered on 14 
September 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, 
paragraph 39.
77 Judgment of 23 November 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos 
Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, EU:C:2017:891, paragraphs 25-26. Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa 
Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220, para-
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adopted by NCAs.78 One could, thus, expect such decisions to have no 
legal effects whatsoever in private enforcement actions relating to the same 
practices. But not so. According to the CJEU, at least when it comes to 
EC commitment decisions, they have legally binding effects which may be 
used for the benefit of the claimant or of the defendant.
The Court’s position in this regard rests on its case-law on the judicial 
review of commitment decisions and its implications for the content, 
nature and reasoning of the “preliminary assessment”. The legitimacy of 
the commitment decision itself depends on the existence of a duly rea-
soned identification (in a preliminary assessment) of anticompetitive prac-
tices justifying its adoption, allowing the Court to control the reasoning 
for the existence of an infringement and whether the commitments com-
ply with the principle of proportionality.79
Commitment decisions may be invoked in private enforcement in vari-
ous scenarios:
Tort actions based on unlawful behaviours required by a commitment 
decision:
a) A behaviour imposed by a commitment decision may infringe 
Articles 101/102, national competition rules, or other rules of EU or 
national law. The Masterfoods rationale implies that national courts 
are bound (irrefutable presumption) by the EC/CJEU’s determina-
tion that the commitments sufficiently dispelled the antitrust con-
cerns identified in the preliminary assessment.80 Courts remain free 
to assess the lawfulness of the behaviours in question under other 
concerns or other legal provisions. For example, a commitment 
decision which rests on the finding that a most-favoured nation 
graph 100. Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, T-873/16, 
EU:T:2018:904, paragraph 99. See also: Caterina Fratea, “Commitment decisions and private 
actions for damages in EU competition law in light of the Gasorba judgment: a new opening from 
the Court of Justice of the European Union?”, European Competition Law Review 39, no. 12 (2018).
78 Judgment of 25 November 2014, Orange v. European Commission, T-402/13, EU:T:2014:991, 
paragraph 31.
79 Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, T-873/16, 
EU:T:2018:904, paragraphs 36-38, 40-42 and 63. Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission 
v. Alrosa Company Ltd, C-441/07, EU:C:2010:377, paragraph41. See also Judgment of 11 July 2007, 
Alrosa Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220, para-
graphs 86-87.
80 The same issue does not arise for NCA commitment decisions, relating to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, because NCAs are prevented from making negative declarations.
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clause in a given standard contract (part of a commitment decision) 
is compatible with EU Competition Law prevents national courts 
from finding that it infringes Articles 101/102 TFEU, but does not 
prevent them from finding that the same clauses infringe other 
national rules (e.g., unfair trading rules81). However, to the extent 
the behaviour in question was strictly required by the commitment 
decision, the defendant has a legitimate “State action” defence. In 
such cases, the EC/NCA may be exposed to claims for damages for 
having obliged an undertaking to infringe EU and/or national law.
b) Tort actions based on the infringements identified in the commit-
ment decision:
 Direct/indirect clients or suppliers of a committing undertaking 
may wish to sue for damages arising from the antitrust infringement 
identified in the commitment decision’s preliminary assessment (i.e. 
a follow-on action to a commitment decision). In Gasorba, the CJEU 
clarified that, under the principles of sincere cooperation, effec-
tiveness and uniform application of EU Law, national courts must 
“take into account” the EC’s preliminary assessment and “regard it 
as an indication, if not prima facie evidence, of the anticompetitive 
nature” of the practice in question.82 While the wording could have 
been clearer, this seems to mean the burden of proof shifts to the 
commitment undertaking to prove the behaviour identified in the 
preliminary assessment did not infringe the TFEU.83 In other words, 
81 See the example of article 7(1)(a) of Portuguese Decree-Law 166/2013, of 27 December (as last 
revised by Decree-Law 128/2019, of 29 August).
82 Judgment of 23 November 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos 
Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, EU:C:2017:891, paragraph 29. AG Kokott Opinion delivered on 14 
September 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:692, paragraph 35. The scope of illegality cannot be determined by the commit-
ments themselves, since these may go beyond what is needed to ensure compliance with the law.
83 This interpretation is consistent with the case-law on the legal effects of commitment decisions in 
contractual disputes involving the committing undertaking. A French court of appeal had already 
interpreted the law in this way – see: Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 15e chambre, 30 March 
2015, DKT v. Eco Emballages and Valorplast (RG 2012000109), overturned in Paris, Pôle 5, ch. 4, 
Judgment of 20 December 2017 (15/07266). On precedents in Hungary, see: Bodnár, “Hungary”, 
130 and 149. For a description of actions filed in Spain following the Repsol commitment decision, 
see Juan Delgado Urdanibia and Eduardo Pérez Asenjo, “Economic evidence and the quantifica-
tion of damage in competition cases in Spain”, in Private Enforcement of Competition Law, eds. 
Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro et al. (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2011), 209.
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in follow-on actions, EC commitment decisions have the same value 
as infringement decisions adopted by NCAs of other MS.
 It is not clear whether similar legal consequences derive from com-
mitment decisions adopted by NCAs (relating to Articles 101/102 
TFEU), but it would be odd to interpret EU law as harmonising the 
legal effects of EC/NCA decisions declaring infringements, while 
allowing different effects for preliminary findings of infringements 
in EC and NCA commitment decisions.
c) Contractual disputes based on behaviour required by a commit-
ment decision:
 Clients/suppliers of a committing undertaking may find that the lat-
ter is bound by an EC or NCA commitment decision which requires 
it to no longer comply with contractual obligations it had entered into 
with them, and which it was not entitled to unilaterally and freely 
withdraw from. Those contractual obligations might have stopped 
being complied with prior to the commitment decision. If they sue 
the committing undertaking, they may be faced with the following 
defence: (a) in what concerns effects after the commitment decision, 
the undertaking is legally required by the commitment decision to 
adopt that behaviour, and so cannot be held liable for damages; and 
(b) in what concerns effects both prior to and following that deci-
sion, the contractual obligations in question already infringed EU 
Competition Law, as identified in the preliminary assessment, and 
were null and void.
 The Court has twice looked at these situations. In Alrosa,84 De Beers 
was prevented by the commitment decision from complying with 
its supply contract with Alrosa, and Alrosa lost the annulment pro-
ceedings it filed before the CJEU (which disagreed with the GCEU). 
In Groupe Canal +,85 the Commission was concerned with absolute 
territorial protection clauses in Paramount’s exclusive distribution 
agreements, and the commitment decision required their elimina-
tion. The French exclusive distributor appealed the commitment 
84 Judgment of 11 July 2007, Alrosa Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220. Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v. Alrosa Company 
Ltd, C-441/07, EU:C:2010:377. AG Kokott’s Opinion delivered on 17 September 2009, European 
Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd, C-441/07, EU:C:2009:555, paragraph 3.
85 Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, T-873/16, 
EU:T:2018:904 (see, in particular, paragraph 27).
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decision, but did not persuade the GCEU that the clause did not 
infringe Article 101(1) or that it complied with Article 101(3). An 
appeal is pending.86
 Unsurprisingly, the Court does not want commitment decisions to 
become “get out of jail free” cards for undertakings who infringe 
Articles 101/102 TFEU. But it is also not too worried about protect-
ing undertakings which enter into anticompetitive agreements and 
then seek to enforce them in court.87 An undertaking subject to a 
commitment decision cannot invoke the obligations imposed upon 
it, in the commitment decision, to escape contractual liability. The 
decision may prevent it from adopting the behaviour it was contrac-
tually required to adopt, but it does not prevent it from compensat-
ing its counterparty for breach of contract (principle of contractual 
freedom, if the contract did not include some applicable exception, 
e.g. force majeure). But this assumes the clause was valid, which is 
the crux of the matter. If the preliminary assessment determined 
the clause was invalid (this assessment is, in principle, specific to the 
market and context of the EC’s assessment), the national court must 
consider it an indication of the existence of the infringement.88
d) Disputes based on infringements of a commitment decision:
 There may be follow-on cases (injunctions or actions for damages) 
based on infringements of EC or NCA commitment decisions.89 
There are already examples of attempts to use commitment deci-
sions in this way,90 but no successful one is known.
86 Case C-132/19 P Groupe Canal + v. European Commission.
87 See AG Kokott Opinion delivered on 17 September 2009, European Commission v. Alrosa 
Company Ltd, C-441/07, EU:C:2009:555, paragraph 61.
88 Judgment of 12 December 2018, Groupe Canal + v. European Commission, T-873/16, 
EU:T:2018:904, paragraphs 100-102. The GCEU referred to Gasorba, suggesting the same legal 
effects apply here (prima facie evidence), but it did not use the exact same language. This case 
showed it may be a risky move for the other contractual party to seek annulment of the commit-
ment decision, instead of simply suing before the national court (and hoping there is no referral). 
Indeed, the GCEU ended up clarifying that Groupe Canal + could not claim, in this case, that the 
requisites of Article 101(3) were met, and even that damage resulting from loss of clients in France 
could be offset by new clients from other MS - see T-873/16, cit., paras 67-72.
89 AG Kokott Opinion delivered on 14 September 2017, Gasorba SL and Others v. Repsol Comercial 
de Productos Petrolíferos SA, C-547/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:692, paragraph 35.
90 See, e.g., for Portugal: Judgment of the Porto Appeal Court of 27 May 2013, [B] v. [C] 
(1569/11.0TJPRT.P1).
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12. Ways out of binding effect of decisions
Although doubts were raised in several MS about whether this obligation 
included in the Damages Directive was compatible with their Constitution 
(because, in some MS, it is unheard of for national courts to be bound to 
the ruling of another court, much less to an unchallenged administrative 
decision), all seem to have correctly transposed the provision into their 
legal orders. However, some MS may be preparing to argue that there are 
limitations which are not reflected in the letter of their transposition.91 
This is certainly one of the Directive’s most controversial provisions, and 
challenges to it are more than likely.
There are, arguably, at least 3 legal grounds which could be invoked as 
exceptions to the legally binding effect of res judicata public enforcement 
decisions of the respective MS:
(i) Argue that Article 9(1) of the Damages Directive violates fundamen-
tal rights recognised in the EU legal order (access to justice, right 
to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal) and is 
invalid. Since national courts are not allowed to control the validity 
of a provision of EU Law,92 this path requires a referral to the CJEU. 
To the extent the provision has been transposed in national law, a 
parallel argument about the national provision is also required.
(ii) Argue that Article 9(1) and its transposition violate the same funda-
mental rights recognised in the national legal order. This argument 
rests on an assessment of compatibility with the MS Constitution 
(and with the ECHR) and on the theory of the limits to the primacy 
of EU Law.
(iii) Argue that, although the defendant exhausted his rights of appeal, 
the EU/MS review courts infringed EU Law. Primacy and uniform 
application of EU Law, and the duty of sincere cooperation, arguably 
require the national court faced with a follow-on action in such a 
case to submit a referral to the CJEU (at the very least, until this is 
clarified by the CJEU, because there are doubts about the interpreta-
tion of Article 9(1) in this scenario).
91 See, in particular, Italy: Article 7 of Legislative Decree No. 3/ 2017; and Susanna Lopopolo, 
“Italy”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive: Transposition in the Member States, org. Barry 
Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro, and Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018),221.
92 Judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 314/85 EU:C:1987:452.
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A part of this debate on compliance with fundamental rights is the same 
for the binding effect of EC decisions, which seems to have been peace-
fully accepted in national courts.93 It may potentially lead to conflicting 
positions by the Supreme/Constitutional courts of each MS, the ECHR 
and the CJEU. The CJEU’s position must be harmonious with its position 
on absence of infringement of fundamental rights in Masterfoods (even 
though not all the reasoning is transposable).94 Ultimately, the primacy 
of EU Law may be jeopardised, with MS courts refusing to comply with 
this obligation of EU Law and injured parties having no effective means of 
recourse to force compliance or to obtain compensation for this infringe-
ment of EU Law.
13. Conclusion
This article has shown that a lot has already been determined, in EU law 
and case-law, about the binding effects of findings of infringements in 
antitrust public enforcement proceedings. While commentators’ attention 
tends to focus on positive declarations of antitrust infringements, there is 
already much to be said about negative declarations, commitment, state 
aid and merger decisions, as well as about non-final decisions and ongoing 
investigations. The emerging picture is that of a largely harmonious case-
law across the board, which sets off from the same general principles to 
arrive at the same solutions for identical situations.
Being aware of the clarifications provided by the case-law is important, 
not only to avoid overestimating the issues of succession of laws which 
some may erroneously imagine to arise from the entry into force of the 
Damages Directive, but also to grasp the full extent to which national 
93 For Portugal, see Judgment of the Lisbon Appeal Court of 9 April 2013, [J] v. [P] (Gas bottles) 
(627/09.5TVLSB.L1-7).
94 Judgment of the Court of 14 December 2000, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd, Case 
C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689. According to the Court, given the judicial means available to undertak-
ings to challenge Commission decisions, directly (before the GCEU, and then CJEU) and indi-
rectly (before the CJEU, via referral), the binding effect of Commission decisions upon national 
courts does not infringe the fundamental right of access to justice, even considering the limited 
review by the Court over complex economic assessments – see Judgment of 6 November 2012, 
Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, EU:C:2012:684, paragraphs 55-63. 
AG Cruz Villalón’s Opinion delivered on 26 June 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and 
Others, C-199/11, EU:C:2012:388, paragraphs 50 and 55. It should be noted that the Court did 
not explicitly address the concern for the independence of the judiciary – on this, see AG Cruz 
Villalón’s Opinion delivered on 26 June 2012, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, 
C-199/11, EU:C:2012:388, paragraphs 43-44.
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sovereignty has already been limited in this regard, and the answers which 
have already been provided to the counterarguments that are likely to be 
raised by those who feel that such encroachments have gone too far. That 
being said, several of the legal controversies discussed in this article are far 
from settled, and will no doubt be the focus of much debate in the years 
to come.
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